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DISLOYALTY AND DENATURALIZATION
FORREST R. BLACK*
In these troublous times, the question becomes important:
"What steps can be taken by legislation and administration to
revoke certificates of naturalization on the ground of subsequent
disloyalty of the grantee?" The British Law is simple and direct.
It provides (a) on the substantive side, for an affirmative
ground of revocation of a certificate of naturalization where
"the person to whom the certificate is granted has shown him-
self by act or speech to be disaffected or disloyal to his
MNajesty".' And (b) from the standpoint of procedure, the
British Act provides for a speedy administrative determination
which grants to the Secretary of State final power to revoke a
certificate of naturalization. The Secretary may create a com-
mittee for this purpose and the committee shall have the power
of a court in respect to (a) the enforcing of attendance of wit-
nesses and examining them on oath, affirmation or otherwise
and the issuance of a commission or request to examine witnesses
abroad and (b) the compelling the production of documents and
(c) the power to punish persons guilty of contempt. By way
of contrast, our law2 provides for only two grounds of revoca-
tion, "fraud" and "legal procurement" and sets up a judicial
rather than an administrative procedure. This article will dis-
cuss specifically the question; to what extent can the British
law be engrafted on our system? And we will then propose a plan
to deal with the problem which it is believed will meet the test
of constitutionality.
* Assistant to the United States Attorney General; A. B., Wisconsin;
M. A., Columbia; LL. B., Ohio State; Ph. D., Brookings Graduate School
of Government; Former Professor of Law, University of Kentucky.1The British Nationality and Status of Aliens Act 1914 as amended'
by the British Nationality and Status Act 1918, c. 83, see. I (Statutes
of England 189, 190).
2 U. S. C., Title 8, sec. 405.
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PART I. INTRODUCTION.
By way of background, it is important at the outset to note
the veering interpretations of the Supreme Court of the United
States in three leading cases dealing with the nature of the
naturalization process. Those cases are Johannessen v. United
States,3 United States v. Ness4 and Tutun v. United States.5
(1) Johannessen v. United States6 was a proceeding under
section 15 of the Act of June 29, 19067 to cancel a certificate
of citizenship granted by a state court ex parte more than seven-
teen years before. It was admitted that the certificate was based
upon the perjured testimony of two witnesses to the effect that
Johannessen had resided in the United States for five years at
least then past. The government is seeking to cancel the cer-
tificate on the ground that it was fraudulently and illegally
procured. Mr. Justice Pitney, speaking for a unanimous court
held (a) that section 15 of the Act of 1906 authorizing direct
proceedings to attack certificates of citizenship was constitu-
tional. (b) That prior decisions of this court holding that a
judgment of a competent court admitting a person to citizenship,
is like every other judgment competent evidence of its own
validity, and go no further than protecting the judgment from
collateral attack; (c) That the doctrine of res judicata or
estoppel by judgment does not apply to an ex parte proceeding
and (d) that the Act of 1906 is not unconstitutional because
it is retrospective in its operation. The court specifically
refused to comment on two queries that had been raised; (1) as
to the conclusive effect of a certificate of naturalization issued
after appearance and cross examination by the Government and
(2)- whether in the absence of a statute such as the Act of 1906,
a court of equity could set aside, or restrain the use of a cer-
tificate of naturalization.
It is interesting to note that the Government in its brief
in the Johannessens case said, "It may be said, ex cathedra, that
the Department of Justice has acquiesced in the view that judg-
ments in naturalization proceedings are not appealable". This
225 U. S. 227 (1912).
A245 U. S. 319 (1917).
r270 U. S. 568 (1926).
1225 U. S. 227 (1912).
34 Stat. 596, 601, c. 3592.8 U. S. Records and Briefs, Vol. 8, No. 230, p. 17.
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view of the Department of Justice, which was overruled in the
later case of Tutun v. United States9 was predicated on the rul-
ing of the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in
United States v. Dolla'0 where that court held that a naturaliza-
tion proceeding under the Act of 1906 was not a "case" within
the meaning of the Judiciary Act of March 3, 1891,11 regulating
the appellate jurisdiction of that court and that therefore the
judgment of of a District court was final.
There is a second doctrine in United States v. Dolla12 which
the Supreme Court of the United States in the case of Tutun v.
United States supra, repudiated in some of its implications. In
the Dolla case the court said, "Naturalization of aliens is an act
of grace, not right". The idea that naturalization is an act of
grace, not right, will be discussed in connection with the analysis
of the Tutun case.
(2) In United States v. Ness13 a suit was brought under Sec-
tion 15 of the Naturalization Act of 1906 to cancel a certificate
of naturalization on the ground of "illegal procurement" be-
c-ause the petitioner failed to file with the clerk the certificate
stating the "date, place and manner" of arrival as provided
in sec. 4 of the Act. Ness admitted the failure but claimed that
his right to a certificate had become res judicata for the reason
that the United States had entered its appearance under sec-
tion II of the Act in the prior proceedings in opposition to the
grant and that its motion to dismiss had been denied. Mr.
-Justice Brandeis speaking for a unanimous court held (a) that
the filing of a certificate of arrival as provided in the section was
an essential prerequisite to a valid order of naturalization; (b)
that the court of naturalization having assumed to dispense with
this requirement, its decision could be set aside on the ground of
illegal procurement and (c) that sections 11 and 15 of the
Naturalization Act afford cumulative protection against fraud-
ulent and illegal naturalization and that in a suit under the
latter to set aside a certificate granted in disregard of a essen-
tial requirement of the statute, the United States is not estopped
by the order of naturalization, although pursuant to the former
'270 U. S. 568 (1926).
177 Fed. 101 (1910).
U26 Stat. 828.
177 Fed. 101, 105 (1910).
245 U. S. 319 (1917).
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section, it entered its appearance in the naturalization proceed-
ing and there unsuccessfully raised the same objection. Thus the
Ness case answers one of the questions left unanswered by the
Johannessen case to wit: "Do sections 11 and 15 afford the
United States alternative or cumulative means of protection
against illegal or fraduluent naturalization? The Ness case holds
that cunulative redress is afforded and that there is no estoppel
against the government even though the prior proceeding was not
ex parte.
The court in the Ness case followed the doctrine of the case
of United States v. Ginsberg,14 where the court said, "An alien
who seeks political rights as a member of this nation can right-
fully obtain them only upon terms and conditions specified by
Congress. . . No alien has the slightest right to naturalization
unless all statutory requirements are complied with."
(3) In Tutun v. United States,15 the question was raised
whether the circuit courts of appeal have jurisdiction to review
a decree or order of a federal district court denying the petition
of an alien to be admitted to citizenship in the United States.
Mr. Justice Brandeis speaking for a unanimous court held (a)
that an order of the District Court granting or denying a
petition for naturalization is a final decision within the meaning
of the Judicial Code see. 128; (b) a petition for naturalization
is a "case" within the meaning of Judicial Code sec. 128 and an
order of the District Court denying the petition is reviewable by
the Circuit Court of Appeals.
The Tutun case is important in that it (1) repudiates the
position of the government in the Johannessen case "that the
Department of Justice has acquiesced in the view that judg-
ments in naturalization cases are not appealable". (2) It
repudiates the doctrine of the Dolla case supra that naturaliza-
tion is an act of grace, and not of right., Mr. Justice Brandeis
said on this point:
The opportunity to become a citizen of the United States Is said to
be merely a privilege and not a right. It is true that the Constitution
does not confer upon aliens the right to naturalization. But it author-
izes Congress to establish a uniform rule therefor. Art. 1, § 8, cl. 4.
The opportunity having been conferred by the Naturalization Act,
there is a statutory right in the alien to submit his petition and evi-
dence to a court, to have that tribunal pass upon them, and, if the
requisite facts are established, to receive the certificate. See United
"243 U. S. 472, 475 (1917).
270 U. S. 569 (1926).
DISLOYALTY AND DENATURALIZATION
States v. Shanahan, 232 Fed. 169, 171. There is, of course, no "right to
naturalization unless all statutory requirements are complied with."
United States v. Ginsberg, 243 U. S. 472, 475; Luria v. United States,
231 U. S. 9, 22. The applicant for citizenship, like other suitors who
Institute proceedings in a court of justice to secure the determination
of an asserted right, must allege in his petition the fulfilment of all
conditions upon the existence of which the alleged right is made
dependent; and he must establish these allegations by competent evi-
dence to the satisfaction of the court. In re Bodek, 63 Fed. 813, 814,
815; In re an Alien, 7 Hill (N. Y.) 137. In passing upon the application
the court exercises judicial judgment. It does not confer or withhold
a favor.
The petitioner in his brief' 6 presented this argument in
a more convincing manner than the Supreme Court although the
court approved of the petitioner's contention. In summary
fashion it might be stated as follows: (a) Naturalization is a
statutory right and not a favor, providing that the preliminary
statutory requirements have been met. (b) The court, unlike
the Congress, does not act as a matter of sovereign grace; it
never so acts, for that would be beyond and outside the judicial
function. (c) Whenever it acts, it acts judicially and by a recog-
nized procedure and (d) Its discretion is a legal and not a per-
sonal arbitrary one.
Tuiun case is also important as background material for
analyzing our problem in that Mr. Justice Brandeis has clearly
stated two ideas; (a) that Congress, from the beginning of the
government has seen fit to provide that admission to citizenship
shall be a judicial function and (b) he has pointed out alternative
procedures that might be established by Congress. On these
points he says:
The function of admitting to citizenship has been conferred exclu-
sively upon courts continuously since the foundation of our Govern-
ment. See Act of March 26, 1790, c. 3, 1 Stat. 103. The federal dis-
trict courts, among others, have performed that function since the Act
of January 29, 1795, c. 20, 1 Stat. 414. The constitutionality of this
exercise of jurisdiction were not a case or controversy within the mean-
ing of Art. III, § 2, this delegation of power upon the courts would have
been invalid. Hayburn's Cfase 2 Dall. 409; United States v. Ferreira,
13 How. 40; Muskrat v. United States, 219 U. S. 346. Whether a pro-
ceeding which results in a grant is a judicial one, does not depend upon
the nature of the thing granted, but upon the nature of the proceeding
which Congress has provided for securing the grant. The United
States may create rights in individuals against itself and provide only
an administrative remedy. United States v. Babcock, 250 U. S. 328,
331. It may provide a legal remedy, but make resort to the courts
available only after all administrative remedies have been exhausted.
Compare New Orleans v. Paine, 147 U. S. 261; United States v. sing
Tuck, 194 U. S. 164; American Steel Foundaries v. Robertson, 262
2' 34 U. S. Records and Briefs, pp. 31-32.
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U. S. 209. It may give to the individual the option of either an admin-
istrative or a legal remedy. Compare Clyde v. United States, 13 Wall.
38; Cherpenning v. United States, 94 U. S. 397, 399. Or it may provide
only a legal remedy. Compare Turner v. United States, 248 U. S. 354.
Whenever the law provides a remedy enforceable in the courts accord-
iug to the regular course of legal procedure, and that remedy is jur-
sued, there arises a ease within the meaning of the Constitution,
whether the subject of the litigation be property of status. A petition
for naturalization is clearly a proceeding of that character.
PART II. COULD CONGRESS CONSTITUTIONALLY CONFER ON
ADmINISTRATIVE OFFICERS THE FINAL POWER TO
REvOKE CERTIpICATE OF NATURALIzATION?
In a legal article entitled "Making Naturalization Ad-
ministrative", 17 Mr. Harold Fields makes the statement that
"the transfer of the power over naturalization from the judiciary
to the executive department can be authorized by Congressional
action." It is submitted that this proposition is subject to some
limitation. Although it is conceded that Congress could con-
stitutionally confer on administrative officials the final determi-
nation of questions affecting admission to citizenship it is not
believed that Congress could transfer from the courts to ad-
ministrative officials the final power to revoke certificates of
naturalization already issued.
In the article above described, the only citation of authority
for the proposition that the whole naturalization process could
be made administrative is a single sentence from Mr. Justice
Brandeis's opinion in Tutun v. United States,18 where he said,
"The United States may create rights in individuals against
itself and provide only an administrative remedy." Three com-
ments should be made in connection with the use of this state-
ment from the Tutzn case. (1) The Tutun case did.not involve
the question of a cancellation of a certificate of naturalization
but raised the point as to whether the Court of Appeals could
review a District Court holding which had denied an applicant a
certificate of naturalization. (2) The quoted statement was
dictum in the Tutun case and it is obviously dictum in so far
as our problem is concerned. (3) A perusal of the Tutun case
will indicate that the only authority therein cited for the doctrine
announced in the quoted sentence was the case of Babcock v.
17 (1935) 15 Boston Univ. L. Rev. 260.
3270 U. S. 563, 576 (1926).
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United States.Y9 The Babcock case was based on a Congressional
statute of March 3, 1885, authorizing the payment of claims for
property belonging to officers and enlisted men which had been
lost or destroyed under certain circumstances. The statute con-
ferred on the accounting officers of the Treasury the power of
"final determination". The court held that claims under this
act were not within the jurisdiction of the Court of Claims. The
statement, which M1r. Justice Brandeis paraphrased, read as fol-
lows in the Babcock case: "That the United States, when it
creates rights in individuals against itself, is under no obligation
to provide a remedy through the courts".20 The Babcock case
cites five cases as authority for the doctrine supra and all of
them concern money claims against the government 2' and it is
submitted that none of them is authority for the proposition that
an administrative officer can be vested with the final power to
cancel a certificate of naturalization.
Affirmatively, we present in outline form, the constitutional
argument to show that Congress cannot confer final power on an
administrative officer to cancel a certificate of naturalization.
(1) What Is the Status of a Naturalized Citizen?
In Luria v. United States,22 the court upheld section 15 of
the Naturalization Act of 1906 dealing with the evidential effect
of taking up a permanent residence in a foreign country within
five years after securing a certificate of naturalization. Mr.
Justice Van Devanter in the opinion 23 pointed out that "under
29250 U. S. 328 (1919).
1'Ibid. p. 331.
"United States ex rel Dunlap v. Black, 128 U. S. 40 (1888), is a
pension case and the court held that there was no judicial relief for a
refusal of an executive officer to increase the pension. Ex Parte Atocha,
17 Wall. 439 (1883), held that there was no appeal from Court of Claims
under a special act granting that court jurisdiction to determine claim
of beneficiary of special statute against the Mexican government.
Gordon v. United States, 7 Wall. 188 (1868), there was a special relief
statute referring claim to Second Auditor of the Treasury Department
for final examination and adjustment. De Groot v. United States,
5 Wall. 419 (1866), Congress authorized in the first instance the Sec-
retary of War to determine amount of the claim and then later Con-
gress authorized the Court of Claims to settle the matter. Comegys v.
Vasse, 1 Pet. 193, there was a treaty with Spain which authorized cer-
tain commissioners to settle certain claims against Spain.
"2231 U. S. 9 (1918). See also 9 Ops. Att. Gen. (U. S.) 359; Boyd v.
Nebraska, 143 U. S. 135, 162 (1891).
Ibid. at p. 22.
149
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our Constitution, a naturalized citizen stands on an equal footing
with a native citizen in all respects, save that of eligibility to the
Presidency (Minor v. Happersett, 21 Wall. 162, 165; Elk v.
Wilkins, 112 U. S. 94, 101; Osborn v. Bank, 9 Wheat. 738, 827)."
(2) The Exclusion and Expulsion Cases Contrasted.
Some light will be thrown on our problem by examining the
distinction that the Supreme Court has made in exclusion and
expulsion cases.24 The statutes give to immigration officials
authority only in cases of aliens and confer no power over
citizens. Therefore in these cases, when the issue of citizenship
or alienage is raised, a jurisdictional fact must be determined.
In order that the pertinency of the exclusion and expulsion
cases to our problem may be appreciated, it should be noted that
when a certificate of naturalization is canceled, the status of
the party affected is changed from that of a person "standing
on an equal footing with a native citizen in all respects, save that
of eligibility to the Presidency" to that of an alien.
Exclusion cases. In exclusion cases, the courts have ap-
parently adopted the rule that a claim to American citizenship
made by a person applying for admission does not entitle him to
a judicial trial of the validity of the claim. This is so even
when the facts alleged establish a prima facie case. Apparently,
the immigration officers may in such cases decide the facts
on which their own jurisdiction depends. This holding was
forecast in the opinion of Mr. Justice Holmes in U. S. v. Sing
Tuck,25 but a definite decision was made in U. S. v. Ju, Toy,2 6
first, that the statutory provision that the decision of the Secre-
tary should be final applied to the question of citizenship, and
second, that the statute so providing was constitutional, as due
process of law did not in such cases require a judicial trial.
This case has been followed in later cases in the Supreme
Court.27 In exclusion cases there has been no indication of a
tendency away from it
2'The author is indebted to Dean William C. Van Vleck for the
statement of the distinction between the exclusion and the expulsion
cases; see "Administrative Control of Aliens" pp. 189, 190 (1932).
194 U. S. 161 (1904).
198 U. S. 253 (1904).
'Tang Tung v. Edsel, 223 U. S. 673 (1912).
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Expulsion cases. In expulsion cases, however, the Supreme
Court has departed from the rule it adopted in U. S. v. Ju Toy.
In these cases the rule as the finality of the decision of the
administrative officers on the issue of citizenship is otherwise.
W\rhen a person within a country against whom a warrant of
arrest in expulsion proceedings has been issued, has presented
substantial evidence tending to establish a claim to citizenship,
he is entitled to a judicial trial of the issue presented by his
claim.2 8 The first judicial statement that there was a dif-
ference between the exclusion and the expulsion proceedings
such that the doctrine of U. S. v. Ju Toy would not apply to the
latter, was in a case decided by the circuit court of appeals of
the seventh circuit.2 9 This distinction was made effective by the
Supreme Court in Ng Fong Ho v. White.30 In that case, two per-
sons of Chinese race had been arrested under warrant of the
Secretary and had been ordered deported after expulsion pro-
ceedings had been completed. They claimed to be citizens on
the ground that they were foreign-born sons of native-born
American citizens. It was conceded that they had been duly
admitted by the immigration authorities when they first arrived
in this country, but the department claimed that an error had
been made at that time because of deception practiced by the
applicants. The latter petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus.
The Supreme Court held unanimously that the petitioners were
entitled to a judicial hearing on the issue of citizenship.
In Ng Fung Ho v. White,31 M'r. Justice Brandeis said:
If the jurisdiction of the Department of Labor may not be tefted
in the courts by means of the writ of habeas corpus, when the prisoner
claims citizenship and makes a showing that his claim is not frivolous,
then obviously deportation of a resident may follow upon a purely
executive order whatever his race or place of birth. For where there
Is jurisdiction a finding of fact by the executive department is con-
clusive, United States v. Ju Toy, 198 U. S. 253; and courts have no
power to interfere unless there was either denial of a fair hearing,
Mian Yozo v. United States, 208 U. S. 8, the finding was not sup-
ported by evidence, American School of Magnetic Healing v. McAn-
nulty, 187 U. S. 94, or there was an application of an erroneous rule of
law, Gegiow 1. Uhl, 239 U. S. 3. To deport one who so claims to be a
citizen, obviously deprives him of liberty, as was pointed out in Chin
Yew v. United States, 206 U. S. 8, 13. It may result also in loss of both
: Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U. S. 276 (1921).
Moy Suey v. United States, 147 Fed. 697 (1906).0259 U. S. 276 (1921).
S259 U. S. 276, 284 (1921).
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property and life; or of all that makes life worth living. Against the
danger of such deprivation without the sanction afforded by judicial
proceedings, the Fifth Amendment affords protection in its guarantee
of due process of law. The difference in security of judicial over
administrative action has been adverted to by this court. Compare
United States v .Woo Jan., 245 U. S. 552, 556; White v. ChinP ong, 253
U. S. 90, 93.
Thus far the attempted analogy between expulsion cases
(wherein administrative action i not final and wherein to deny
the person claiming to be a citizen the right to judicial review
would violate the Fifth Amendment) and the cancellation of
certificates of naturalization has stressed the jurisdictional
fact3 2 theory insofar as the former is concerned.
The point may be raised that all of this discussiou concern-
ing the jurisdictional fact theory is not applicable to the can-
cellation process. In answer we point out that Congress has
only empowered the courts to cancel certificates on two grounds:
fraud and illegal procurement. Further, the basic act asserts
that "an alien may be admitted to become a citizen of the United
States in the manner indicated under sections 372 to 394 of this
Title and not otherwise". (U.S.C.A. Title 8, see. 372.) The
statute contains many prerequisites, the existence or non-
existence of which are jurisdictional facts, such as insufficient
residence, 33 racial eligibility,34 ability to speak English,35 that
he once withdrew his declaration in order to evade the draft,31
that he is an anarchist or polygamist, 37 etc.
Further, neither fraud nor illegal procurement is a word
of art containing a specific legal content. Both involve a fusion
of questions of law and of fact. If the attempt were made by
Congress to confer this power of cancellation on administrative
officials and make their determination final, it is believed that
such a setup would violate due process of law. The outlines of
jurisdictional power are too vague and amorphous to permit
finality in the administrative agency. The holder of a certificate
of naturalization is on a par, in the eyes of the law, with a native
born citizen. When in a cancellation proceeding he asserts the
m See my article "The Jurisdictional Fact Theory and Administra-
tive Finality" in the (1937) 22 Cornell Law Quarterly 349 and 515.
=8 U. S. C. A. 382.
"8 U. S. C. A. 359.
,58 U. S. C. A. 365.
2 11bid. 366.3TI'bid, 364.
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existence of the jurisdictional facts which Congress has declared
to be prerequisites for citizenship, he is entitled to a judicial trial
of that issue.
But there is another reason which would seem to strengthen
the analogy and that is developed admirably in Dean William C.
Van Vleck's book, The Administrative Control of Aliens. He
points out 38 that "the list of the causes for expulsion reads like
a criminal code". Although technically the courts have not
characterized the power as "criminal", the Report of the
Minority of the Committee on Immigration and Naturalization
in connection with H. R. 10078,3 9 has characterized it as "quasi-
criminal". Dean Van Vleek points out that: 40
In its essential elements, however, it partakes largely of the nature
of criminal justice, in the nature of many of the charges mnade, the kind
of facts which must be proved and the kitid of issues decided, and more
especially in its effects on the interests of the persons against whom it
is brought.
The same thing can be said for many of the proceedings in
the cancellation of a certificate of naturalization, especially
where the charge is that the person is opposed to the principles
of the Constitution,4 1 that he has been guilty of an illegal entry
into the country ;42 or that he is a polygamist or that he is opposed
to organized government. All of these cancellation proceedings
smack of a criminal trial and a system of administrative finality
would not assure the safeguards traditionally incorporated into
the administration of our criminal law such as a public trial,
information to the accused as to the nature and cause of the
accusation, the right to confront witnesses against him, com-
pulsory attendance of witnesses in his favor, trial by an impartial
jury and counsel to assist him in his defense.
(3) The Military Law Cases-in Reverse.
AMr. Justice Brandeis in Ng Fung Ho v. White, supra, com-
pares the exclusion cases to those cases wherein a person not in
fact in the military establishment is attempted to be tried by
NP. 219.
70th Cong. 1st Sess., H. R. 484, p. 8.
P. 224.
"Rowan v. United States, 18 Fed. (2d) 246 (1927).
"United States v. Beda, 30 Fed. Supp. 446 (1936).
K. L. J.-2
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court martial or to be made amenable to the military law. He
says:
The situation (exclusion of one claiming to be a citizen) bears
some resemblance to that which arises where one against whom iVro-
ceedings are being taken under the military law denies that he is in the
military service. It is weZZ settled that in such a case a writ of habeas
corpus will issue to determine the status. (Ex Parte Milligan, 4
Wall. 2.)
The Milligan 43 doctrine prohibits the military officials them-
selves from having the final determination whether they have
jurisdiction of the person; that question will be disposed of by the
courts when raised by a writ of habeas corpus. It is interesting
to note that the court in the Milligan case not only held that the
I Military Commission set up in Indiana did not have jurisdiction
over Milligan but went further by dictum and said that Con-
gress did not have the constitutional authority to clothe the
Military Commission with this power.
(4) Revocation of Patents as an Analogy.
It has been often said that "naturalization under our Con-
stitution is in all substantial respects like a patent for land or
for an invention-a grant on the part of the Government, con-
ditioned on compliance with certain express statutory require-
ments." 44  It is well settled by the cases that after a patent
is once issued, the patent office has no power to revoke, cancel
or annul the patent.4 5 The only authority to annul or revoke
is in the courts of the United States, and the same rule applies
to a patent for land granted by the officers of the Land Depart-
ment.46 But it may be said that these rules are merely based
on constructions of the existing Congressional statutes dealing
with patents for inventions and for land and throw no light on
the query whether Congress could confer final power on the
administrative officers.
Two cases on this point are suggestive. In McCormick
Machine Co. v. Aultman,4 7 the Patent office attempted to
revoke a patent in part upon a re-application of the patentee for
a reissue of it, by repudiating its former rulings. The court
43Bx Parte Milligan, 4 Wall. 2 (1866).
" 8 U. S. Records and Briefs, case No. 230, p. 18.
41 Stedman on Patents, sec. 131.
4' United States v. Stone, 2 Wall. 525, 635 (1864).47 169 U. S. 606 (1897).
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said, "To attempt to cancel a patent upon an application for
reissue when the first patent is considered invalid by the ex-
aminer would be to deprive that applicant of his property with-
out due process of law, and would in fact be an invasion of the
judicial branch of the government".4s  Considered in con-
nection with this doctrine is the case of United States v. Bell
Telephone Co.,4 9 which clearly states that the revoking power in
so far as a patent is concerned exists in the judicial branch
irrespective of any statute so conferring that power on the courts.
The court said:
In England grants and charters for special privileges were supposed
to issue from the King, as prerogatives of the Crown and the power
to revoke them was long exercised by the King by his own order or
decree. This mode of vacating charters and patents gradually fell
into disuse; and the same object was obtained by scire facias, return-
able into the Court of King's Bench or of Chancery. * * * In this
country, where there is no kingly prerogative, but where patents foi
lands and inventions are issued by the authority of the government
and by officers appointed for that purpose, who may have been imposed
upon by fraud or deceit, or may have erred as to their power, or made
mistakes in the instrument itself the remedy for such evils is by pro-
ceedings before the judicial branch of the government.
But the point was raised by demurrer that since there was
no statute which conferred this jurisdiction on the courts "that
no authority or power exists in law to entertain such a suit".
The court held that both on the basis of English law and on the
Constitution of the United States such a "jurisdiction to repeal
a patent by a decree of a Court of Chancery as an exercise of its
ordinary powers was well established", 50 both as to patents for
for land and for inventions. "It would be a strange anomaly
in a government organized upon a system which rigidly separates
the powers to be exercised by its executive, its legislative and its
judicial branches, and which in emphatic language defines the
jurisdiction of the judicial department, to hold that in that
department there should be no remedy for such a wrong. "51
(5). The View of the Solicitor's Office of the State Depart-
ment.
Ar. Richard W. Flournoy, Jr., Assistant Solicitor, Depart-
ment of State, in a scholarly article entitled "Naturalization and
' Id. p. 612.
128 U. S. 315 (1888).
KId. at p. 360.
Id. at p. 357-358.
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Expatriation", 52 had the following to say about administrative
finality insofar as cancellation of certificates of naturalization
was concerned:
It is believed, however, that such an important thing as the can-
cellation of citizenship should not result from a mere administrative
decision. In this relation may be recalled the observations of the court
in Burkett v. Mcarty, 10 Bush (Ky. 758, 760. In declaring that loss
of citizenship could properly be pronounced only by a court of law in
regular judicial proceedings, the court said, "To decitizenize a free man
is a tremendous blow. It deprives him of his chosen country and home
and sunders his most endearing relation, social and civil."13
PART III. COULD CONGRESS CONSTITUTIONALLY PROVIDE FOR
REVOCATION OF A CERTIFICATE OF NATURALIZATION
ON THE GROUND OF SUBSEQUENT DISLOYALTY I
(In the discussion of this point, it is assumed that the final
power of revocation is in the judicial department of the Govern-
ment.)
(A) The Nature of the Power to Grant Certificates of Natural-
ization.
As a basis for the discussion of the power of revocation it
will be helpful first to outline the nature of the power to grant
citizenship by naturalization.
(1) The Power to Provide for Naturalization Is Exclu-
sively in the Federal Congress.
The Constitution of the United States confers on Congress
the power "to establish an uniform rule of naturalization
throughout the United States". 5 4 Chief Justice Marshall in
1817 declared "that the power of naturalization is exclusively
1 (1922) 31 Yale L. J. 702, 848 at 866.
13It should be pointed out that there is some trend to enlarge the
function of Administrative officers in the naturalization process. (See
the Trend Toward Administrative Naturalization by Henry B. Hazard,
Bureau of Naturalization in 21 American Political Science Review, 342.
Mr. Hazard refers to the act of June 8, 1926 (44 Stat. at L. 709, 710),
which in order to relieve the congestion of federal district courts
authorized federal judges to designate examiners from the Bureau of
Naturalization to conduct preliminary hearings and to make findings
and recommendations thereon. Two things should be noted about this
statute, (a) it applies to petitions for naturalization and not to cancel-
lation of certificates and (b) even in its limited field, the decision of
the administrative official is not final.
"Art. I., sec. 8.
DISLOYALTY AND DENATURALIZATION
in Congress does not seem to be, and certainly ought not to be
controverted'.5
(2) Dual Citizenzship and the Effect of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
The original Constitution contained no definition of citizen-
ship although it made use of the word "citizens". Further it
recognized not only citizens of each state but also citizens of the
United States. 51" In Dred Scott v. Hanford,57 Chief Justice
Taney said, "It is very clear that no state can by any act or law
of its own, passed since the adoption of the Constitution, intro-
duee a new member into the political community created by the
Constitution of the United States. It cannot make him a mem-
ber of this community by making him a member of its own." The
general view prior to the Fourteenth Amendment seems to have
been that United States citizenship, except in cases of natural-
ization, was subordinate to and derived from state citizenship. 58
Mr. Chief Justice White in the opinion in the Selective Draft
Cases,5 9 declared that the Fourteenth Amendment had "com-
pletely broadened the national scope of the Government under
the Constitution by causing citizenship of the United States to
be paramount and dominant instead of being subordinate and
derivative ".
(3) Naturalization Is a Statutory Privilege and an Alien
Has No Inherent Right to Become a Citizen.
To become a citizen of the United States by naturalization is
not a right but a statutory privilege, which can be granted by the
courts only under provision of laws enacted by Congress. 0
Aliens in the United States have no inherent right to be admitted
to citizenship. Congress alone has the undoubted authority under
the Constitution to prescribe the terms and conditions upon
which such a privilege shall be granted.6 ' Mr. Justice Gray in
Chirac v. Chirac, 2 Wheat. 259, 269 (1817).14 See Gettys, The Law of Citizenship in the United States, p. 3.
6 19 Howard 393 (1857).
"Burdick, The Law of the American Constitution, p. 318, 322
(1922).
245 U. S. 366. 389 (1918).
- In re Buntaro Kumagai, 163 Fed. 922 (1908).Ex Parte Eberhardt, 270 Fed. 334 (1927).
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the case of United States v. Wong Kim Ark,62 said, "Nor can it
be doubted that it is the inherent right of every independent
nation to determine for itself, and according to its own constitu-
tion and laws, what classes of persons shall be entitled to its
citizenship."
(4) An Administrative Officer or a Court Cannot Add to
the Statutory Requirements for Naturalization.
In In re fellea,63 a regulation of the naturalization bureau
provided that a declaration of intention shall not be filed or
accepted unless accompanied by a certificate of arrival. The
statute of Congress did not provide for this prerequisite. The
court held that the regulation was invalid because not authorized
by the Naturalization Act. Tuttle, District Judge, said:
It is settled law that while an executive tribunal or official may
constitutionally be empowered by Congress to make such regulations as
are reasonably necessary to the proper execution of the statute, so long
as such regulations are merely administrative in character and relate
only to the enforcement of the statute, yet such executive tribunal or
official cannot, constitutionally, either with or without the sanction of
Congress, make any rule or regulation the effect of which would be to
add to, take from or otherwise change such statute, for that would be
to permit the executive department to encroach upon and usurp the
functions of the legislative department, to which alone belongs the
power to legislate.
The law is well settled that the prerequisites prescribed by
statute cannot be dispensed with,6 4 and in Tutun v. United
States,6 5 the court said that Congress having laid down the rules
governing admission of aliens to citizenship, it is not within the
power of a court, in the exercise of its discretion to add to them.
In State v. District Court of 16th Judicial District,66 it was held
that:
the court has no authority in naturalization proceedings to include in
its judgment a provision forever debarring applicant from citizenship,
since it is authorized to act only upon the application then pending,
and even if the naturalization law does not permit a subsequent appli-
cation, the court has no authority to prevent Congress from enacting
a law which will permit such application.
169 U. S. 649, 669 (1897).
5 Fed. (2d) 687 (1925).
"United States v. Ginsberg, 243 U. S. 472 (1916).
-12 Fed. (2d) 763 (1926).
202 Pac. 387 (Mont., 1921).
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(5) The Status of State Courts in the Naturalization
Process.
Although the federal statutes have always conferred
authority on certain state courts to admit aliens to citizenship 7
for the purpose of naturalization all courts under the act are
federal courts.s In the naturalization process the state courts
act as governmental agencies of the federal government.6 9
Further, the procedure in state courts for this purpose is con-
trolled by Congress.7 0
(B) The Existing Cancellation Statute Analyzed.
Although the constitutionality of the existing cancellation
statute7' has been upheld in Johannessen v. United States,7 2 and
in Luria v. United States,73 this fact throws little direct light on
our problem which involves the constitutionality of a substantive
provision which would permit cancellation on the ground of sub-
sequcnt disloyalty. Our present cancellation statute provides
for cancellation on only two grounds, fraud and illegal procure-
inent. Although the act involved may be subsequent to the grant,
both grounds relate back to the time of the grant of the cer-
tificate. As was said in the Luria case, supra, the cancellation
statute does not forfeit the naturalized alien's right to citizen-
ship. It is aimed only to cancel a previous certificate for fraud
or illegal procurement in its inception. It has further been held
in United States v. Albertini,7 4 that this cancellation statute does
not detract from or add to the rights and remedies of the govern-
ment as they existed prior to the statute. The design of the
statute is to enable the government to exercise jurisdiction over
naturalization proceedings and in its discretion to oppose, con-
test and convert the proceedings into those actually adversary.
It has been further held in In re Maculoso's Naturalization,75
that the statute only furnishes a new remedy for which there
67 Van Dyne on Citizenship, II.
IU. S. v. Aakervik, 180 Fed. 137 (1910).
Eldredge v. Salt Lake County, 37 Utah 188, 106 Pac. 939 (1910).
7I re Gee Hop, 71 Fed. 274, 275 (1895).
U. S. C. Title 8, sec. 405.
225 U. S. 227 (1911).
"231 U. S. (1913).
14206 Fed. 133 (1913).
237 Pa. 132, 85 Atl. 149 (1912).
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was an existing remedy. Hence, the remedy is cumulative and
not exclusive. Consequently, the fact that the statute was
retrospective and applied to naturalization proceedings under
former laws did not raise a constitutional question3 s
Before the passage of the Naturalization Act of 1906 provid-
ing expressly for the cancellation of certificates of naturaliza-
tion on grounds of fraud or illegal procurement, it had been
held that the United States could sue for the cancellation of a
decree of naturalization where it had been fraudulently or
illegally obtained.77
(C) Certificates of Naturalization under the Existing Statutes
Have Been Canceled by Indirection where Disloyalty Was
Involved.
Under our statutes the only method of cancellation, where
disloyalty is involved, is indirect in the sense that it relates back
directly to the statutory grounds of fraud or illegal procure-
ment. Some of these cases seem rather far-fetched in their reason-
ing because of the interval of time elapsing between the date of
the certificate and the date of the disloyal utterance or act.
Only a few of the more extreme cases will be presented here.
Because of the strained construction indulged in, they should
show that in the minds of some judges at least there is an impera-
tive need for a; direct statutory provision permitting cancellation
on the ground of subsequent disloyalty.
In United States v. Wurstcrbarth,78 a native of Germany
was naturalized and became a citizen'in 1882. He took the oath
to support the Constitution of the United States and renounced
allegiance to his former sovereign. Thirty-five years later dur-
ing the World War he expressed his desire for a German victory
and stated that he recognized an allegiance to Germany superior
to that due the United States. The court held that that attitude
expressed in 1917, a few days after our entrance into the war,
unexplained, warrants cancellation of his certificate on the
ground that it was procured thirty-five years earlier by fraud, in
that his oath to renounce allegiance to any foreign country was
false and excepted the land of his nativity.
1111Schurmann v. U. S. 264 Fed. 917, app. dis. 257 U. S. 621 (1921).
77U. S. v. Norsch, 42 Fed. 417 (1920); U. S. v. Kornmehl, 89 Fed.
10- (1898); see also 3 Moore's International Law Digest 500.
"249 Fed. 908 (1918).
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In United States v. Darmer 79 a German was naturalized in
1888. During the War, when asked to buy Liberty Bonds, he
emphatically refused on the ground that he was of German
descent and made other statements indicating allegiance and
loyalty to Germany rather than to the United States. The cer-
tificate was canceled on the same ground as in the preceding
case.
United States v. Herberger,0 a German was naturalized in
1912. During the War he wrote a letter to his sister in Germany
which tended to show the naturalized citizen's sympathy with
Germany. The court canceled the certificate of naturalization
on the ground of fraud stating that "the existence of a condi-
tion being shown, it will be presumed, in the absence of a show-
ing to the contrary, to have theretofore existed for a reasonable
time."
The cases discussed above should be distinguished from
such cases where the applicant at the time of naturalization
really believed in the overthrow of government by force or main-
tained in fact his former allegiance and failed to disclose it, such
as United States v. Olsson,8 ' United States v. Swelgin,8 2 United
States v. Stuppielo. 3 But where considerable periods of time
elapse between the date of naturalization and the date of the dis-
loyal utterance or act, we are inclined to favor the view expressed
by the Circuit Court of Appeals of the Ninth Circuit in Rowan v.
United States,8 4 when it said:
"To say that one who was not a member of the I. W. W. in 1907, by
merely joining in 1912 and remaining a member through 1917 must in
1907 have been opposed to organized government, or been lacking in
allegiance, is far too conjectural. Nor do we think that the proven fact
that 10 years after 1907 Rowan was guilty of violation of the Espionage
Act is logically probative of his state of mind in 1907.'
The cases discussed above wherein thirty-five years elapse
between the naturalization and the occurrence of the disloyal
utterances or acts place too great a strain on the fiction of rela-
tion-back and make a mockery of the presumption of a "reason-
able time" within which the same attitude of mind is supposed
"248 Fed. 989 (1917).
272 Fed. 278 (1921).
196 Fed. 562 (1912).
=254 Fed. 884 (1918).
260 Fed. 483 (1919).
'18 Fed. (2d) 246, 248 (1927).
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to prevail in the defendant. While we can understand the
patriotic motives of the judges in these wartime cases, we can-
not endorse the legal doctrine utilized to reach the desired result.
In the absence of Congressional action, which would affirmatively
make disloyalty a ground for revocation, it is not a legitimate
function of the courts-to resort to this kind of chicanery.
(D) Are the Dicta in United States v. Wong Kim Ark, and in
Osborn v. United States Bank Controlling?
In Tinited States v. Wong Kim Ark,8 5 the only question
involved was whether under the 14th Amendment a child born
in the United States of parents of Chinese descent (who could
not be naturalized under the Congressional act) was a citizen
of the United States and the court held that he was. But by
way of dictum the court, through Mir. Justice Gray, said, "The
power of naturalization, vested in Congress by the Constitution,
is a power to confer citizenship, not a power to take it away". 8,
Standing alone and wrenched from its context, it might appear
at first blush that this doctrine would prevent Congress from
providing for a revocation of a certificate of naturalization on the
ground of subsequent disloyalty. But such is not the case. The
court in making the statement had in mind the particular facts
in the case to wit, that the 14th Amendment permitted by birth
the creation of a natural born citizen, even though the parents
of the child could not become naturalized citizens under the Con-
gressional act. The court elaborating on the argument said,
"Congress having no power to abridge the rights conferred by
the Constitution upon those who have become naturalized citizens
by virtue of acts of Congress, a fortiori, no act or omission of
Congress, as to providing for the naturalization of parents or
children of a particular race, can affect citizenship acquired as a
birthright, by virtue of the Constitution itself, without any aid
of legislation. The 14th Amendment, while it leaves the power
where it was before, in Congress, to regulate naturalization has
conferred no authority upon Congress to restrict the effect of
birth, declared by the Constitution to constitute a sufficient and
complete right to citizenship."
5169 U. S. 649 (1897).
1Id. at p. 703.
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In Osborn v. United States Bank,87 the question involved
was whether the incorporation of the Bank of the United States
by Congress gave the circuit courts of the United States juris-
diction of suits by and against the bank, and the court held that
it did. But by way of dictum the court said,
* * * A naturalized citizen is, indeed, made a citizen under an act of
congress, but the act does not proceed to give, to regulate, or to pre-
scribe his capacities. He becomes a member of the society, possessing
all the rights of a native citizen, and standing, in the view of the con-
stitution, on the footing of a native. The constitution does not author-
ize congress to enlarge or abridge those rights. The simple power of
the -national legislature is, to prescribe a uniform rule of naturaiza-
tion, and the exercise of this power exhausts it, so far as respects the
indlvidua. The constitution then takes him up, and, among other
rights, extends to him the capacity of suing in the courts of the United
States, precisely under the same circumstances under which a native
might sue. He is distinguishable in nothing from a native citizen,
except so far as the constitution makes the distinction; the law makes
none. There is, then, no resemblance between the act incorporatfng
the bank, and the general naturalization law.
It is submitted that neither the Wong Kim Ark nor the Osborn
dictum is controlling insofar as our problem is concerned. This
point will be made clearer in the discussion which follows deal-
ing with the correlative right of expatriation on the part of the
citizen and the deprivation of citizenship by the government upon
the commission of certain subsequent acts by the citizen.
(E) Citizenship Is a Status Relationship and the Privileges and
Duties Appurtenant Thereto Are of a Correlative Nature.
In Minor v. Happersett,s8 Chief Justice Waite said,
The citizen owes the state allegiance and is entitled to its protec-
tion. Allegiance and protection are, in this connection, reciprocal
obligations. The one is compensation for the other, allegiance for
protection and protection for allegiance.
Professor W. W. Willoughby has said,89
Allegiance, as its etymology indicates, is the name for the tie which
binds the citizens to his state-the obligation of obedience and support
which he owes to it.
Professor Dudley 0. AlcGovney has said,90
"It may be asked, what law determines the distribution and divi-
sion of all persons in the world among the several states? What law
determines which person belongs to that state and to that? Being an
international matter, it would seem that international law itself should
furnish the rule of division. But it does not do so. International law
has here a complete hiatus. The only rule that it lays down is, that
89 Wheat. 737 (1824).
21 Wall. 162, 165 (1875).
*0American Journ. of Inter. Law, vol. I, p. 914 (1907).
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each state may determine for itself what persons it will regard as
nationals. In short it lays down a confusion, and confusion exists."
From the standpoint of municipal law the state is unlimited in the
regulation of the admission and loss of citizenship."
(F) The Status of Citizenship May Be Terminated by the
Citizen by Expatriation with the Consent of the Govern-
ment.
The status of citizenship may be terminated by the Citizen
through the process of expatriation. Since 1868 the right of
expatriation has been recognized by statute.92 Prior to 1868,
judicial decisions in the United States as to existence of a right
of expatriation, in the absence of a statute creating it have not
been uniform.9 3 It should be noted, however, that no one may
abandon his or her American citizenship without the consent of
the government. In the early case of Shanks v. Dupont,9 4 this
doctrine was declared and has not since been questioned. In that
case the court said,
The general doctrine is, that no persons can by any act of their
own, without the consent of the government, put off their allegiance,
and become aliens.
Professor Willoughby commenting on this case says,9 -
In other words, the Government has the same control over the
denial of a continuance of citizenship that it has over the creation or
recognition of that status.
Expatriation has been defined as "the voluntary renuncia-
tion or abandonment of nationality and allegiance.9 6 Since this
voluntary renunciation or abandonment however can only be per-
mitted under terms and conditions subject to the control of the
government, it would seem that of the two parties to this status
arrangement, known as citizenship, the government has the
upper hand. Professor Willoughby has said, 97
The law is clear, whatever this right (of expatriation) may be, it
is subject to full control by the government, both affirmatively and
negatively. That is, the government may provide that certain acts
upon the part of the citizen may be punished by a denial to him or her
thenceforth of the rights and privileges of citizenship, or may be
deemed to operate as a renunciation of his or her American citizenship.
American Citizenship, 11 Col. L. Rev. 231, at 233.
91 See Gettys, The Law of Citizenship in the U. S., p. 2.
2 15 Stats. at L. 223, chap. 249.
"Willoughby, vol. I, p. 375.
" 3 Peters 242 (1830).
Op. Cit., p. 378, vol. 1, n. 93.
"Van Dyne, Citizenship, p. 269.
17Op. Cit., vol. I, p. 377, n. 93.
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(G) Forfeiture of Rights of Citizenship as Well as Rights to
Become Citizens-the Desertion Statutes-the Only Law of
the United States under which Conviction for the Commis-
sion of a Crime Entails a Forfeiture of the Rights of
Citizenship.
See. 1996 (U.S. Comp. Stat. 1901)98 provides:
All persons who deserted the military or naval service of the
United States, and did not return thereto or report themselves to a
provost-marshal within sixty days after the issuance of the proclama-
tion by the President, dated the 11th day of March, 1865, are deemed
to have voluntarily relinquished and forfeited their rights of citizen-
ship, as well as their right to become citizens; and such deserters shall
be forever incapable of holding any office of trust or profit under the
United States, or of exercising any rights of citizens thereof.
Sec. 1998 (U.S. Comp. Stat. 1901) 99 provides:
Every person who hereafter deserts the military or naval service of
the United States, or who, being duly enrolled, departs the jurisdiction
of the district in which he is enrolled, or goes beyond the limits of the
United States, with intent to avoid any draft into the military or naval
service, lawfully ordered, shall be liable to all the penalties and for-
feitures of section nineteen hundred and ninety-six.
The courts have held that the provisions of section 1998
subjecting every deserter to a forfeiture of all rights of citizen-
ship can only take effect on conviction by court martial.'0 0 One
punished under this section might lose his rights as a citizen and
be debarred from ever holding any federal office' 01 and will also
be denied a subsequent admission to citizenship.10 2 Professor
Willoughby commenting on these sections dealing with desertion
from the military or naval forces of the United States or evading
the draft says,'0 3
It would appear that this forfeiture of the "rights of citizenship" is
not equivalent to the forfeiture of citizenship itself, for, though the
rights are lost, the obligations are not destroyed.
By an amendment of 19121'4 the Revised Statute, sees. 1996
and 1998 discussed above has been changed so that such for-
feiture of citizenship does not take place thereafter, except dur-
ing times of war, and persons deserting the military or naval
forces in times of peace are thus placed beyond the purview of
' P. 1269.
"P. 1269; U. S. C., Title 8, sec. II.
- Kurtz v. Moffitt, 115 U. S. 487 (1885).
"
0 In re Carver, 142 Fed. 623 (1905).
''In re Gnadt, 269 Fed. 189 (1920).
'3Op. Cit., vol. I, p. 351.
37 Stat. at L. 356, chap. 336, sec. 1.
KENTUCKY LAw JoURNAL
the penalty of the law of 1865. Luella Gettys in her book,
"The Law of Citizenship in the United States" says, "the law
providing for forfeiture of citizenship on conviction for deser-
tion appears to be. the only law of the United States under which
conviction for the commission of a crime entails a forfeiture of
citizenship."1 05
(H) Annulment of American Citizenship where American
(Woman) Citizen Marries a Foreigner.
In Mackenzie v. Hare,06 the question was raised as to the
constitutionality of the annulment of American citizenship under
the provision of the act of March 2, 1907,107 that any American
woman who marries a foreigner shall take the nationality of her
husband, the contention being that, under the Constitution the
plaintiff's citizenship became a right or privilege by birth which
could not be taken away from her except as a punishment for
crime or by her voluntary expatriation. To this the court
replied:
As a Government, the United States is invested with all the attri-
butes of sovereignty. As it has the character of nationality it has
the powers of nationality, especially those which concern its relations
and intercourse with other countries. We should hesitate long before
limiting or embarrassing such powers.... It may be conceded
that a change of citizenship cannot be arbitrarily imposed, that is,
imposed without the concurrence of the citizen. The law in contro-
versy does not have that feature. It deals with a condition voluntarily
entered into, with notice of the consequences. . . . may involve
national complications of like kind as her physical expatriation may
involve. Therefore, as long as the relation lasts, it is made tantamount
to expatriation. That is no arbitrary exercise of government.
Marriage of an American woman with a foreigner is tanta-
mount to voluntary expatriation; and Congress may, without
exceeding its power, make it so as it has in fact done. It will
be noted that the court conceded that citizenship could be for-
feited by "voluntary expatriation or as a punishment for crime"
and the latter is the gist of our thesis. The legal effects of
marriage by an American (woman) citizen have been changed
by the Married Woman's Naturalization Act of September 22,
1922,ls which was passed since the Mackenzie case.
P. 165.
110239 U. S. 299 (1915).
2 34 Stat. at L. 1228.
101142 Stat. at L. 1021.
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(I) Presumption of Expatriation-Resumption of Residence in
Native State or Residence in Other Foreign State After
Naturalization in the United States.
The methods of expatriation have been summarized as
follows:100 (a) Expatriation by naturalization in foreign
state.110 (b) Expatriation by oath of allegiance to a foreign
state." ' (c) Expatriation by desertion." 2  (d) Expatriation by
marriage."13 (e) Expatriation by cancellation of certificate on
grounds of fraud or illegal procurement," x4 and (f) By treaty,
expatriation by resumption by naturalized American citizen of
residence in native country.
In addition to the above methods of expatriation, by which
it is automatically effected, the Act of March 2, 1907, provides
for a presumption of expatriation "when any naturalized citizen
shall have resided for two years in the foreign state from which
he came, or for five years in any other foreign state." It shall
then be presumed that he has ceased to be an American citizen.
But this presumption may be overcome by presenting satisfactory
evidence on seven points outlined by the Department of State." 5
It should also be noted that our statutes now provide that "no
American citizen shall be allowed to expatriate himself when the
country is at war"."16 However the Act of 1907 dealing with the
presumption of expatriation is vague and many questions are
still undecided, (a) what is the legal effection of the presump-
tion; (b) no time limit is provided within which the rebuttal
must be made to overcome the presumption; (c) does the effect
of failure to overcome the presumption result in loss of citizen-
ship or only in withdrawal of protection- (while protection may
be denied by the Department of State it would appear that no
power has been delegated to that department to revoke citizen-
ship.) 117
' Gettys, The Law of Citizenship in the U. S., pp. 162, 167.
"' 34 Stat. at L. 1228, chap. 2534, sec. 2.
. Ibid., Moore's Digest 111, 718 ff.
Sees. 1996 and 1998, Rev. Stats. 1876.34 Stat. at L. 1228, chap. 2534, sec. 3.
1,634 Stat. at L. 596, Part I, chap. 3592, sec. 15.
u"Dept. of State, March 6, 1928, "Presumption of Expatriation May
be Overcome", etc.
"I U. S. C., Title 8, sec. 16, Chap. L
' See Lambie, Presumption o7 Cessation of Citizenship, 24 Am. J.
of Inter. Law 264, 278 (1930); see Gettys, Ibid. at p. 173.
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PART IV. CoNciuTSIoNs.
(1) In Luria v. United States,118 231 U.S. 9, the court made
it plain that under our cancellation statute the grounds of
fraud and illegal procurement are not substantive grounds of
revocation but relate to procedural irregularities either on the
part of the applicant or the court. Further, in the Luria case the
court characterized the provision dealing with subsequent resi-
dence in the native or foreign country which is declared to be
prima facie evidence of a lack of intention to become a permanent
citizen of the United States at the time of the application for
citizenship, as follows: "It will be observed that this provision
prescribed a rule of evidence, not of substantive right."119
Further, the fact that Luria was naturalized prior to the enact-
ment of this evidentiary presumption did not prohibit its applica-
tion to him, for the court pointed out that "a right to have one's
controversies determined by existing rules of evidence is not a
vested right". 20
(2) We suggest that a penalty section be added to the federal
criminal code providing that any naturalized citizen, who is con-
victed of any of the following offenses, shall, in addition to the
penalties already provided for such offenses, have his certificate
of naturalization canceled. This new penalty section shall be
applicable to the following offenses:
Treason (U.S.C. Title 18, sec. 1, where the death penalty
is not imposed) ;
Misprision of treason (U.S.C. Title 18. sec. 3);
Inciting rebellion or insurrection (U.S.C. Title 18, sec. 4);
Criminal correspondence with foreign governments (U.S.C.
Title 18, see. 5) ;
Seditious conspiracy (U.S.C. Title 18, see. 6);
Recruiting for service against the United States (U.S.C.
Title 18, sec. 7);
Enlisting to serve against the United States (U.S.C.
Title 18, see. 8).
Other offenses may be brought within the scope of the
penalty provision and the cancellation may be left to the discre-
tion of the court instead of being made mandatory.
- 231 U. S. 9 (1913).
39Id. at p. 25.
1 Id. at p. 26.
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(3) The British law1'2 1 affirmatively sets up a substantive
ground of revocation in the provision that a certificate of
naturalization shall be canceled if "the person to whom the cer-
tificate is granted has shown himself by act or speech to be dis-
affected or disloyal to his Majesty". The penalty proposal sug-
gested has three obvious advantages over an attempt to copy the
British practice of setting up affirmatively a substantive ground
of revocation. (a) It obviates the difficulty of formulating a
definition of "disloyalty" which would constitute effectively a
new substantive federal offense. (b) Our existing substantive
law covering the field of "disloyalty" is comprehensive and has
been interpreted and upheld by the courts. (c) Even if the
formulation of a new substantive offense of "disloyalty" for the
purpose of cancellation of certificates of naturalization was satis-
factory on grounds of policy, it might not successfully run the
gauntlet of constitutionality, under the First and Fifth Amend-
ments.
(4) The second feature of the British law which vests the
final power of revocation in the Secretary of State could not be
engrafted on our statute for the reason that Congress could not
constitutionally confer on an administrative official the final
power of revocation of a certificate of naturalization. This is
shown supra by the discussion of the patent and exclusion cases.
(5) Whether we adopt the penalty proposal and attach it to
existing criminal statutes, or attempt to spell out a new substan-
tive ground for revocation based on subsequent disloyalty, which
would be criminal in its nature, we cannot avoid the jury trial
provisions of the Sixth Amendment. In either case, a criminal
statute will be involved which is to be distinguished from our
present cancellation procedure on the grounds of fraud or illegal
procurement, both of which date back to the time of the grant-
ing of the certificate, and are equitable in their nature. In
Luria v. United States, 12 2 the court in construing the present can-
cellation procedure held that a jury trial is unnecessary. The
court said:
The right asserted and the remedy sought were essentially equit-
able, not legal, and this according to the prescribed tests made in a
suit In equity. Parsons v. Bedford, 3 Pet. 433, 447; Irvine v. Marshal,
20 Howard 558, 565; Root v. Railway Co., 105 U. S. 180, 207'. In this
1 I Statutes of England 189, 190.
1-231 U. S. 9 (1913).
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respect, it does not differ from a suit to cancel a patent for public
lands or letters patent for an invention. See United States v. Stone,
2 Wall. 525; United States v. San Jacinto Tin Co., 125 U. S. 273; United
States v. Bell Telephone Co., 128 U. S. 315.
(6) Our proposal would raise only one constitutional ques-
tion and that would be as to the validity of the penalty provision
per se, for the reason that the courts have already upheld the
constitutional power of Congress to enact those sections123 of the
federal criminal code known as "offenses against the existence
of government" to which our proposal would attach an
additional penalty provision.
The penalty provision per se is constitutional for the fol-
lowing, reasons:
(A) The nature of the revocatory power depends upon the
nature of the grant which is revoked. We have shown that
(1) The power to provide for naturalization is exclusivelyL" in the
federal Congress.
(2) Congress Is under no obligation to pass a naturalization law,
but having done so, the alien's right is a statutory one. The Constitu-
tion does not confer upon aliens the right to naturalization.'1
(3) No alien has the slightest right to naturalization unless all
statutory requirements are complied with. An alien who seeks polit-
ical rights as a member of this nation can rightfully obtain them only
upon terms and conditions specified by Congress."
(4) Under our system, the terms and conditions for naturalization
are a matter of legislative discretion; the function of admission has
been conferred exclusively on the courts.m
(5) An administrative officer or a court cannot add to the statutory
requirements for naturalization2
(6) The United States is not estopped by the order of naturaliza-
tion, even though it entered its appearance in opposition to the grant
in the original proceedings.'s
3U. S. C., Title 18, sec. 1. Treason-"The crime of treason is
defined by the Constitution itself, thus taking it out of the power of
legislative regulation". Charge to Grand Jury, 5 Blatch. 549, 30 Fed.
Cases No. 18,271 (C. C., N. Y. 1961).
U. S. C., Title 18, sec. 3. Charge to Grand Jury, 1 Bond 609, 30 Fed.
Cases No. 18,272 (C. C. Ohio 1861).
U. S. C., Title 18, sec. 4. U. S. v. Greathouse, 4 Sawy: 457, 26 Fed.
Cases No. 15,254 (C. C. Cal. 1863).
U. S. C., Title 18, sec. 5. Charge to Grand Jury, Treason and
Piracy, Fed. Cases No. 18,277 (C. C. Mass. 1861).
U. S. C., Title 18, sec. 6. In re Impaneling, etc., 26 Fed. 749 (1886).
U. S. C., Title 18, secs. 7 and 8. Charge to Grand Jury, 2 Spr.
292, 30 Fed. Cases No. 18,726 (D. C. Mass. 1863).
Chirac v. Chirac, 2 Wheat. 259 (1817).
11Tutun v. United States, 270 U. S. 568 (1925).
'2'United States v. Kinsberg, 243 U. S. 472, 475 (1916).
'-1Tutun v. United States, 270 U. S. 568 (1925).
28 1n re Mellea, 5 Fed. (2d) 687 (1927).
'2 United States v. Ness, 245 U. S. 319 (1917).
DISLOYALTY AND DENATURALIZATION
(B) The status of citizenship involves privileges and
duties appurtenant thereto of a correlative nature. "Allegiance
and protection are reciprocal obligations. "130 Further the
renunciation of prior allegiance and the oath "to support and
defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies,
foreign and domestic and bear true faith and allegiance to the
same"131 is a continuing obligation which remains in force and
effect as long as the status relationship exists. Congress can
provide that a naturalized citizen convicted of violating one of
these offenses against the existence of government of his adoption
can have his certificate of naturalization canceled as part of the
penalty for his offense.
(C) The desertion statute' 32 affords a precedent for our
proposal. Although it applies only to members of the military
or naval service, it has been upheld by the courts.1 33 This
desertion statute which provided for forfeiture of citizenship
on conviction for desertion has been characterized as "the only
law of the United States under which conviction for the com-
mission of a crime entails a forfeiture of citizenship. "1 s4
(D) The need for a candid, legislative declaration, as our
proposal envisages, is emphasized by the attitude of our courts
in those cases' 3" wherein certificates of naturalization (under
the existing statutes) have been canceled by indirection where
subsequent disloyalty was involved. If the American people
believe that it is a sound national policy to denaturalize on the
ground of disloyalty, Congress should so declare and thus remove
the temptation from the courts to resort to legal chicanery in
many cases in order to achieve the desired result.
"Minor v. Happersett, 21 Wall. 162, 165 (1874).
" U. S. C., Title S, Chap. 9, sec. 381.
Secs. 1996 and 1998, U. S. Comp. Stats. 1901, p. 1269.
2 Kurtz v. Moffitt, 115 U. S. 487 (1884); In re Carver, 142 Fed.
623 (1906); In re Gnadt, 269 Fed. 189 (1920).
" Gettys, The Law of Citizenship in the U. S., p. 165.
'1 U. S. v. Wursterbarth, 249 Fed. 908 (1918); U. S. v. Darmer,
248 Fed. 989 (1918); U. S. v. Herberger, 272 Fed. 278 (1921).
